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principal ideas currently in print in the
United States. Equally riveting to anyone
formulating realistic strategy is Corbett’s
disenchantment with supposedly “deci-
sive” grand battles, his concept of geo-
graphically shifting and limited command
of the seas, and his praise for interservice
cooperation and amphibious operations.
He was the first English-speaking writer
indissolubly to link the military-naval,
diplomatic, and economic elements of
strategy.
As Jablonsky notes, Captain A. T. Mahan’s
scope is narrower than Corbett’s. The
American naval officer was writing in
1890 to further the technological and
strategic revolution unleashed by the re-
cent advent of the steam-driven, heavily
gunned, thickly armored battleship.
Jablonsky reprints only the first sections
of Mahan’s opus, those in which Mahan
makes his “political-economic argument
for sea power.” The editor has omitted
entirely the great bulk of the book, the
thirteen historical chapters concerning
both grand strategy and “the art and
science of command,” as derived from
Anglo-French naval battles in the age of
square-rigged ships of the line. This is a
regrettable exclusion, because Jablonsky
has adopted and emphasized the imagi-
native thesis of Jon Tetsuro Sumida that
Mahan was as interested in “teaching
command” as in the strategy of sea power.
The limited excerpt from The Influence of
Sea Power is insufficient to permit the
reader to judge the validity of Sumida’s
proposition or to assess the utility of
Mahan’s ponderous dissections of sea
battles, which were fought with a technol-
ogy that had already disappeared when the
naval officer wrote more than a century ago.
Half a loaf is nonetheless better than
none, and Jablonsky’s balanced arrange-
ment of Corbett, Douhet, and Mitchell
alongside Mahan should earn this volume
a place on the bookshelves of all students
of strategy who are sated with the current
deification of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.
KENNETH J. HAGAN
Adjunct Professor of Strategy
Naval War College
Smith, Gene A. Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commo-
dore of Manifest Destiny. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2000. 223pp. $34.95
Thomas ap Catesby Jones is best known
for his mistaken seizure of Monterey,
California, on 20 October 1842, believing
that the United States and Mexico had
gone to war. The occupation lasted
barely overnight before the American flag
had to be ceremoniously lowered and the
Mexican flag rehoisted. Locally, the event
was an occasion for many banquets and
dances, but on the national level more se-
rious repercussions caused a crisis in re-
lations between Mexico and the United
States.
Living in Monterey, I had often won-
dered about this incident, which is men-
tioned only briefly as a footnote in local
histories. Now, with this biography of
Thomas ap Catesby Jones, I have a much
better understanding of a colorful part of
Monterey history.
But this book offers much more. It ex-
plores the life of a controversial and
complicated man whose naval career
lasted half a century, from 1805 to 1855.
In this period the United States went
through a transformation from a young
coastal nation on the Atlantic seaboard to
a power that spanned the continent, a
nation pursuing a “Manifest Destiny,”
with interests stretching well beyond its
borders.
B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 1
5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:13 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Maruyama and Smith: Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
While Jones made no truly significant,
long-lasting contribution to the U.S.
Navy, his career personified the times.
He was a contemporary of better-known
Isaac Hull, Oliver Hazard Perry, Matthew
F. Maury, and John Dahlgren, and like
them he contributed to the evolution of
the American navy. He was a hero of the
War of 1812, introduced innovations as
an inspector and superintendent of ord-
nance, carried the Stars and Stripes to
Hawaii in the 1820s, and helped to incor-
porate California into the United States.
Yet Jones was not an atypical commander
of his day; he was a striking personality
in an age in which individual tempera-
ments helped shape the Navy.
Gene A. Smith does a masterful job in
chronicling the life of Thomas ap Catesby
Jones, from his appointment as a mid-
shipman in 1805 to his court-martial in
1850 on charges that included fraud
against the United States, libel, neglect of
duty, and oppression. The court found him
guilty and suspended him for five years.
Today’s standards for court-martial were
not applied to the Jones case; it is doubt-
ful that due process and rules of evidence
were followed. Attitudes about naval dis-
cipline were changing, but unfortunately,
Jones had not changed with them. He
was probably convicted because of his
past behavior as an old-fashioned tyrant,
making him a useful example with which
to enforce new attitudes concerning
shipboard discipline. Richard Henry
Dana’s Two Years before the Mast and
Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, among
others, had so changed public perception
that attitudes such as those of Jones were
no longer acceptable. In a sense, one
might liken the 1840s and 1850s to the
1980s and 1990s, where attitudes of ac-
ceptable behavior changed, and those
who did not change along with them
eventually paid the consequences. The
earlier era dealt with naval disciplinary
methods such as flogging, while the more
recent attitude change concerned male
behavior and sexual harassment.
Although the book is well researched and
documented, it may be somewhat diffi-
cult to follow for those unfamiliar with
the geography. For example, the actions
of Jones in the War of 1812 and around
New Orleans and the Hawaiian Islands in
the 1820s would have been easier to fol-
low if maps had been provided. I could
easily follow the discussion concerning
Monterey and California only because I
live there.
Beyond the life of Jones, the book describes
well the mores, attitudes, and practices of
the era. For example, career patterns of
naval officers; the relationship between
private, financial, and military affairs;
ambivalence toward slavery; the chaos
created by the California gold rush; and
many other apparently disconnected top-





Padfield, Peter. Maritime Supremacy and the Open-
ing of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns That
Shaped the Modern World, 1588–1782. New York:
Overlook Press, 2000. 340pp. $35
“Maritime supremacy is the key which
unlocks most, if not all, large questions
of modern history, certainly the puzzle of
how and why we—the Western democra-
cies—are as we are. We are the heirs of
maritime supremacy.” So begins the ar-
gument of naval historian Peter
Padfield’s latest work. Like Nelson,
Padfield is prone to bold acts, and in this
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